Denver Journal of International Law & Policy
Volume 41
Number 1 Fall/Winter
44th Annual Sutton Colloquium

Article 5

January 2012

The Arab Spring, U.S. Foreign Policy, and the Question of
Democracy in the Middle East
Nader Hashemi

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/djilp

Recommended Citation
Nader Hashemi, The Arab Spring, U.S. Foreign Policy, and the Question of Democracy in the Middle East,
41 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 31 (2012).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at Digital
Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Journal of International Law & Policy by an
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,digcommons@du.edu.

THE ARAB SPRING, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, AND THE QUESTION OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST
NADER HASHEMI

Shortly after the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak, Aluf Benn, the editor-in-chief
of Haaretz, wrote a column titled "Mubarak's departure thwarted Israeli strike on
Iran."' His argument was that the Arab Spring had fundamentally transformed the
geopolitics of the Middle East ushering "in a new era of uncertainty for the entire
region, and for Israel in particular." 2 His observation is an astute one as it both
draws attention to linkages between different conflicts in the Middle East as well
as highlighting how the spread of democracy has forced a reassessment of national
security priorities by countries across the region.
The Arab Spring has also overturned a binary and simplistic view of the
political divisions in the Middle East. Long-standing assumptions about a regional
order defined by a pro-Western "moderate Arab" and Israeli bloc versus an antiWestern axis comprised of Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah/Hamas is analytically
distorting today. What the Arab Spring has done is help clarify what Middle East
scholars have known for a long time-that the fundamental political chasm in the
Middle East that shapes internal politics is not between pro-Western and antiWestern forces nor is it between Shia and Sunni or Arab and Jew, but rather it is
the enormous gulf that separates longstanding authoritarian regimes from the
people they rule over.
The principle near-term consequence of the Arab Spring, therefore, is that for
the first time a new global spotlight is being directed at dictatorial regimes. Those
countries that have yet to experience a democratic revolt are now scrambling to
buy off popular discontent with salary increases, new state subsidy packages, and
promises of political reform. 3 Simultaneously, a new global recognition has been
given to democratic movements and the aspirations of millions of Arab and
Muslims who seek hurriya (political freedom), adala itima 'iyya (social justice),
and karama (dignity). Prior to the Arab Spring, it was long assumed that the voice
* Nader Hashemi is the Director of the Center for Middle East Studies and an Assistant Professor
of Middle East and Islamic Politics at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University
of Denver. He is the author of ISLAM, SECULARISM AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: TOWARD A
DEMOCRATIC THEORY FOR MUSLIM SOCIETIES and co-editor of THE PEOPLE RELOADED: THE GREEN
MOVEMENT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR IRAN'S FUTURE.
1. Aluf Benn, Mubarak's Departure Thwarted Israeli Strike on Iran, HAARETZ (Feb. 13, 2011,
1:27 AM), http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/mubarak-s-departure-thwarted-israeli-strike-oniran-1.343012.
2. Id.
3. See Toby C. Jones, Saudi Arabia's Regional Reaction, THE NATION (Aug. 24, 2011),
http://www.thenation.com/article/62962/saudi-arabias-regional-reaction.
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of people of the region did not matter in terms of Western policy.4 There was a
tacit and widespread assumption that this voice was too fractured, too politically
immature, or too radical to be taken seriously.
Similarly, there was an erroneous assumption that the Arab authoritarian
order was there to stay. In the same way that a decade ago longstanding dictators
in Jordan, Morocco, and Syria passed on their political thrones to their sons, it was
widely thought (and in some political circles hoped) that the same process would
follow in Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and beyond. This assumption no longer applies,
as a new generation of Arabs and Muslims have come of age and are politically
asserting themselves. The old political order is gradually receding and a new one
is emerging on the horizon where the theme of democracy is now at the center of
the politics of the region. Where does U.S. foreign policy fit into this picture?
Like the rest of world, the Obama Administration was caught off guard by the
Arab Spring. Its initial reaction toward the Egyptian revolt suggested as much.
Secretary of State Clinton claimed in the early days of the protests that "[o]ur
assessment is the Egyptian government is stable"5 while Vice President Biden,
echoing a comment by President Obama two years earlier, affirmed that "I would
not refer to [Mubarak] as a dictator." 6 Yet two weeks later President Obama, along
with most of the world, was hailing the Egyptian revolution and praising the
democratic aspirations of the Tahrir Square protesters as a manifestation of
7
longstanding American principles and values.
Praise for the Arab Spring by the Obama Administration has been a consistent
theme of his presidency since that moment. This praise has also largely enjoyed
bipartisan support in Congress. These recent public statements by senior American
politicians in support of democracy in Middle East, however, ignore longstanding
U.S. policy where political stability was preferred over parliamentary democracy.
Stability was a code word for support for authoritarian regimes that protected U.S.
interests from hostile forces emerging from within and outside the region. In this
article, I seek to provide a brief overview of this forgotten history that
substantively begins after World War II when the U.S. emerged as a global
superpower and continued until the 2011 Arab Spring. I also wish to comment on
4. See Rami G.Khouri, The Arab Awakening, THE NATION (Aug. 24, 2011), http://www.thenat
ion.com/anicle/1 62973/arab-awakening.
5. US Urges Restraint in Egypt, Says Government Stable, REUTERS (Jan. 25, 2012, 5:56 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/25/us-egypt-protest-clinton-idUSTRE7007RC20110125.
6. Mubarak is Not a Dictatorbut People Have the Right to Protest, PBS: NEWSHOUR (Jan. 27,
Prior to his visit to
2011), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics/jan-junell/biden_01-27.html.
Egypt in 2009 to deliver his famous lecture on US-Islamic relations, President Obama was asked if he
considered Mubarak an authoritarian leader. He replied: "No, I tend not to use labels for folks. I haven't
met him; I've spoken to him on the phone. He has been a stalwart ally, in many respects, to the United
States. He has sustained peace with Israel, which is a very difficult thing to do in that region." See Press
Release, The White House, Interview of the President by Justin Webb, BBC (June 1, 2009), http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the_ pressofficefranscript-of-the-Interview-of-the-President-with-Justin-WebbBBC-6-1-09.
7. Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the President on Egypt (Feb. I1,
2011), availableat http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/02/11/remarks-president-egypt.
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the emerging challenges to U.S. interests in the region, with a focus on the
implications for Israel that flow from the spread of democracy in the region.
I.

U.S. OPPOSITION TO DEMOCRACY INTHE MIDDLE EAST: Two POST-9/11
EVENTS

Evidence of U.S. opposition to democracy in the Middle East was on display
on several occasions after September 11, 2001. The terror attacks that killed 3,000
people in New York and Washington, D.C. traumatized the United States and
became the defining issue for the contemporary generation of American citizens.
As a consequence it forced a re-examination of U.S. policy toward the Muslim
world in general and the Arab Middle East in particular. The American public,
along with leading members of the U.S. foreign policy establishment, were trying
to make sense of what had happened. What had gone wrong, why do they hate us,
and what was the new way forward in terms of U.S. policy toward the Middle
East? In a famous speech in November 2003, President Bush, reflecting on past
U.S. policy toward the region drew a direct link between American support for
dictatorial regimes, violence, and the question of democracy:
Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of
freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe - because in the
long run, stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty. As long
as the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it
will remain a place of stagnation, resentment, and violence ready for
export. 8
The phrase "stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty" is an
indirect way of acknowledging two important facts: (1) that for 60 years the U.S.
has been supporting authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and (2) this policy
had come back to haunt the United States. As The 9/11 Commission Report
acknowledged, "[o]ne of the lessons of the long Cold War was that short-term
gains in cooperating with the most repressive and brutal governments were too
often outweighed by long-term setbacks for America's stature and interests."9 The
purported political stability that was assumed to accompany this policy was no
longer guaranteed and a new grand strategy toward the Muslim world was needed,
one which President Bush described as "a forward strategy of freedom in the
Middle East."' 0 The following table, produced by The Economist, lays out the

8. George W. Bush, President of the United States, Remarks by President George W. Bush at the
20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy (Nov. 6, 2003), available at http://www.
ned.org/george-w-bush/remarks-by-president-george-w-bush-at-the-20th-anniversary.
The fact that
fifteen of the nineteen hijackers on September 11, 2001 came from one country, Saudi Arabia, confirms
the linkage between political despotism and violence.
9. NAT'L COMM'N OF TERRORIST ATTACKS, THE 9/11 COMMIssION REPORT: FINAL REPORT ON
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, 376 (2004).
10. George W. Bush, supra note 8.
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problem." Note the connection between the low democracy rankings of the listed
countries and their close relations with the United States.
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In May 2003, a second revealing event took place that laid the bare the
tension and contradictions between U.S. values and interests in the Middle East.
Careful scrutiny of what transpired helps understand why in the past the U.S. has
preferred authoritarian regimes in-the Middle East to democratic ones, and why a
transition to a new policy after the Arab Spring will be difficult for any U.S.
administration.
In the lead-up to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, the Bush Administration was
hoping to open a second battlefront into Iraq from the north, across the TurkishIraqi border. The newly elected government in Turkey was subjected to
considerable pressure from Washington to acquiesce to this request, including as
an incentive a USD $32 billion dollar aid package that was desperately needed to
bolster a sagging Turkish economy.12 While initially Ankara seemed to be
receptive to the offer, Turkish public opinion was strongly opposed to any role
Turkey might play in the invasion of Iraq (about 90 percent of the Turkish public
After an
strongly opposed Turkish involvement in the invasion of Iraq).'
extensive public debate in the media and in parliament, the Turkish government,
bowing to overwhelming public sentiment, refused the American request.
After the toppling of Saddam in March 2003, Deputy Defense Secretary
Wolfowitz traveled to Turkey. In a famous interview on CNN-Turk, he publicly
criticized the Turkish government for its non-cooperation in the invasion of Iraq
and then he stated "[1]ets [sic] have a Turkey that steps up and says we made a
11.

ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, DEMOCRACY INDEX 2010: DEMOCRACY IN RETREAT 5-7

(2012), availableat http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy_1ndex 20 10 web.pdf.
12. Dexter Filkins & Eric Schmitt, Turkey Demands $32 Billion U.S. Aid Package if It Is to Take
Partin a War on Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2003, at A15.
13. Nasuh Uslu et al., Turkish Public Opinion Toward the United States In the Context of the Iraq
Question, MIDDLE E. REV. OF INT'L AFF., Sept. 2005, at 75, 76.
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mistake." 4 Wolfowitz then added a revealing comment that he wished the Turkish
military would have stepped forward and played a more prominent role in shaping
Turkish foreign policy in the lead-up to the war.
I think for whatever reason they did not play the strong leadership role
on that issue that we would have expected . . . . [A]ll I'm saying is that

when you had a[n] issue of Turkey's national interest and national
strategy I think it's perfectly appropriate, especially in your system, for
the military to say it was in Turkey's interest to support the United
States in that effort.'s
These controversial comments unleashed a furious debate in Turkey.
Wolfowitz's desire that the Turkish military play a more prominent role in politics
was shocking in light of modem Turkish history. At the time, Turkey was just
emerging from a long period of authoritarian rule dominated by the intrusive role
of the armed forces that had toppled four civilian governments, most recently in
1997. One year earlier, in 2002, Turkey's freest and most inclusive election took
place bringing the Justice and Development Party to power.' 6 While Wolfowitz's
statement was shocking from a political development perspective, it was
completely understandable from a U.S. foreign policy point of view. As this case
amply demonstrates, it is much easier for the U.S. to deal with military regimes
than with democratic parliaments who reflect the will of the people. One can
project forward and imagine the complications and difficulties that might arise if
Washington has to deal with democratically-elected governments across the region
in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab
Emirates, and Oman instead of the pro-Western monarchies and family
dictatorships that are currently in power.
This example establishes a key principle that has long guided U.S. foreign
policy in the Middle East. Greater democracy does not always translate into
greater support for U.S. geo-strategic interests in the region. There is often a
chasm between popular indigenous nationalist sentiments on key geo-strategic
issues versus the foreign policy preferences of the United States. In this context
Tamara Coffman Wittes has correctly observed that the
broad problem that haunts American democratization efforts is that ...
[the] general preference for democratic politics has long been tempered,
in regard to the Arab world, by the knowledge that the victors of a
democratic process in most Arab countries are unlikely to be the parties
who share America's policy preferences in the region.' 7

14. Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfwitz, Interview with CNN Turk (May 6, 2003) (transcript
on file with U.S. Dep't of Def.), available at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspxtranscr
iptid=2572.
15. Id.
16. See Soner Cagaptay, The November 2002 Elections and Turkey's New Political Era, MIDDLE
E. REV. OF INT'L AFF., Dec. 2002, at 42.
17. TAMARA COFMAN WITTES, FREEDOM'S UNSTEADY MARCH: AMERICA'S ROLE IN BUILDING

ARAB DEMOCRACY 21 (2008). Another example of the clash between U.S. interests in the Middle East
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In other words, as former Secretary of State Madeline Albright once
observed, "Arab public opinion, after all, can be rather scary."' 8
II.

THE LONGER HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON DEMOCRACY AND U.S. POLICY

Prior to September 11, 2001, theoretical discussion on the impact of foreign
intervention in promoting democratization in the Middle East was limited in the
academic literature. If it was seriously discussed at all views were polarized. This
polarity is best captured by William Quandt's observation that "it is unfair to say
that American policy has been consistently hostile to democratic movements per se
in the Middle East"' 9 versus that of the editors of the Middle East Report who
maintain that "in its 20th century engagement with the Middle East, Washington
has consistently opposed and subverted those forces pursuing any measure of a
democratic program." 20 It is a premise of this article that the bulk of the empirical
evidence lies with the second claim.
The broader U.S. strategic position on the topic has been that as long as there
was no immediate clash between U.S. interests and democracy; U.S. policy could
support democratization processes and movements, albeit cautiously. The case of
contemporary Turkey illustrates this point. During the 20th century, the United
States supported the democratization of Turkey. Efforts to expand and deepen
democracy in Turkey to include even religious-based political parties with an
Islamist past were not opposed by the U.S. In fact, Turkey has repeatedly been
praised by both Republican and Democratic Administrations as a role model for
the rest of the Islamic world-one which the U.S. would like to see replicated in
other Muslim majority societies. This support for democracy, however, was
always conditional. Hypothetically speaking, if during this period a democratically
elected Turkish parliament would have voted to withdraw from NATO, close down
the U.S. military base in Incirlik, and sever relations with Israel, American support
and enthusiasm for Turkish democracy would have rapidly abated. Recent
tensions in U.S.-Turkish relations suggest as much.
During the first decade of the 21st century, Turkey experienced a steady
process of democratization but not without controversies and setbacks. 2' As
and greater democracy was on display when it was revealed that the Bush Administration was
contemplating bombing Al Jazeera in Qatar because of its reporting on the Iraqi insurgency and the
negative effects with was having on the US occupation of Iraq. David Leigh & Richard Norton-Taylor,
MPs Leaked Bush Plan to Hit al-Jazeera,THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 9, 2006), http://www.guardian.co.uk/me
dia/2006/jan/09/lraqandthemedia.politicsandiraq.
18. Madeleine K. Albright, Bridges, Bombs or Bluster?, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2003, at 2, 13.
19. Rex Brynen et al., Introduction: Theoretical Perspectives on Arab Liberalization and
Democratization,in POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE ARAB WORLD 3, 19

(Rex Brynen et al. eds., 1995) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
20. Id.
21. See Howard Eissenstat, Turkey's General Resign, INFORMED COMMENT: THOUGHTS ON THE
MIDDLE EAST HISTORY AND RELIGION (Feb. 2, 2011), http://www.juancole.com/2011/08/eissenstatturkeys-generals-resign.htmi. See also Aliza Marcus, The HistoricalBlindness of Turkey's Detractors,
FOREIGN POLICY (Nov. 24, 2010), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/11/24/the historical
blindness of turkeys detractors?page=full.
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Turkey democratizes, the government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, responding to
public pressure, has become outspoken on the question of Palestinian suffering.
Given that the plight of the Palestinians is a key marker of identity for many Arabs
and Muslims, politicians increase their profile and popularity by speaking out on
the topic. 22
Following the 2008-2009 Israeli war in Gaza, there has been a noticeable
rhetorical shift in Turkish foreign policy toward the Israel-Palestine conflict.
Turkish-Israeli relations reached a nadir in May 2010 when the Israeli Navy tried
to stop an international aid flotilla to Gaza. Nine Turkish civilians were killed in
the raid, which lead to a major international crisis, a special UN investigative
report, and the rupturing of Turkish-Israel relations. 23 The mainstream U.S.
foreign policy analysis of these events was revealing.
Reporting on growing Turkish assertiveness in the Middle East and the
anxiety it was creating in Washington, the New York Times published an insightful
article titled "Turkey Goes from Reliable Ally to Thorn for U.S."
Turkey is seen increasingly in Washington as "running around the
region doing things that are at cross-purposes to what the big powers in
the region want," said Steven A. Cook, a scholar with the Council on
Foreign Relations. The question being asked, he said, is "How do we
24
keep the Turks in their lane?"

According to a senior administration official, "[t]he president has said to
Erdogan that some of the actions that Turkey has taken have caused questions to be
raised on the Hill [Congress] .. . about whether we can have confidence in Turkey
as an ally." 25 He added, "[the Turks] need to show that they take seriously
American national security interests." 26 A new assertive Turkish foreign policy, in
part buttressed by its democratization process, is clearly becoming a problem for

U.S. foreign policy.
The tension between U.S. policy and democracy in the Middle East was
further exposed a few years earlier in the West Bank and Gaza. In 2006,
Palestinian legislative council elections were held with full U.S. support and
monitoring by international observers. Jimmy Carter, in conjunction with the
National Democratic Institute, sent a team that verified that the electoral process
was free and fair.27 When it was announced that Hamas had won a solid and
22. Nader Hashemi, Revisiting Erskine Childers' Thesis on the 'Broken Triangle': Why Palestine
is Central to Resolving Islam-West Relations, in ISLAM-WEST RELATIONS: TOWARD A CIVILIZED
DIALOGUE (Nigel Dingwall ed.) (forthcoming) (manuscript at 11-13).
23. Mark Landler, Israel Faces Deepening Tensions With Turkey Over Raid, and Bond With U.S.
Frays, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2010, at A7.
24. Sabrina Tavemise & Michael Slackman, Turkey Goes from Pliable Ally to Thorn for U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2010, at Al0.
25. Daniel Dombey, US Warns Turkey on Iran and Israel, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2010, 11:05 PM),
http://www.ft.com/intlcms/s/0/35d0le4e-a895- lldf-86dd-00144feabdcO.html#axzz28NT2gBYx.
26. Id.
27. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 109"' CONG., PALESTINE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL

ELECTIONS-C HALLENGESOF HAMAS' VICTORY 18 (Comm. Print 2006).
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surprising victory, U.S. support for these elections, which were arguably the freest
elections in history of the Arab world, quickly soured and the Bush Administration
tried to covertly subvert them. 28 The lesson here is clear. From the perspective of
U.S. foreign policy, democracy was acceptable as long as the results worked in
favor of securing American strategic interests in the region. If the elections did
not, then democracy was a problem.
III. WHAT ARE WESTERN STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

Historically, the Middle East's strategic value lay in its geographic
importance linking the continents of Asia, Europe, and Africa. The region was of
particular interest to the British because it was a conduit on the way to India, the
jewel in the crown of their empire. The importance of the Middle East changed
significantly, however, in 1907 when oil was discovered in Iran, leading the British
navy on the eve of World War I to switch from coal to oil as its primary energy
source.
After World War II, the United States gradually replaced Britain (and to a
lesser degree, France) as the dominant external power in the region, which
effectively transformed the Persian Gulf from a British to an "American lake." 29
During the Cold War, there was serious concern in the United States about Soviet
penetration in the Middle East, which the 1979 Soviet invasion and occupation of
Afghanistan amplified. It is debatable, however, how big of a threat the Soviets
actually posed to U.S. interests in the region. A post World War II modus vivendi,
or unwritten understanding, existed between Moscow and Washington that the
Middle East, particularly its vast energy reserves, was to be a Western sphere of
influence. This is not to deny that the Soviet Union did not try to exploit
opportunities to expand its influence. In the early 1950s, for example, after the
U.S. refusal to sell arms to Egypt, Nasser turned to the Soviet Union for support.3 o
The main external influences in the region, however, for most of the second half of
the 20th century have always been American and to a lesser extent British. This
partly explains why these governments led the coalition in the 1991 Gulf War and
the 2003 Iraq invasion and occupation.
During the height of the turmoil engendered by the Iranian Revolution in
1979, then National Security Advisor Brzezinski coined the term the "arc of
crisis." 31 His reference was to the Middle East, or as he described it, that part of
28. David Rose, The Gaza Bombshell, VANITY FAIR (Apr. 2008), http://www.vanityfair.com/pol
itics/features/2008/04/gaza200804.
29. DANA H. ALLIN & STEVEN SIMON, THE SIXTH CRISIS: IRAN, ISRAEL, AMERICA AND THE
RUMORS OF WAR 96 (2010).
30. GALIA GOLAN, SOVIET POLICIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST: FROM WORLD WAR II TO
GORBACHEV 45 (1990); Rashid Khalidi, The Superpowers and the Cold War in the Middle East, in THE
MIDDLE EAST AND THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY, POLITICS, AND IDEOLOGIES 157, 165-66 (David W.
Lesch & Mark L. Haas eds., 2012).

31. Steve R. Weisman, The Middle Thicket, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2003), http://www.nytimes.
comi/2003/05/27/world/the-mideast-thicket.htmln=Top%2fReference%2fTimes%20Topics%2f
Subjects%2fT/o2fTerrorism.
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the globe which "stretches along the shores of the Indian Ocean, with fragile social
and political structures in a region of vital importance to us threatened with
fragmentation. The resulting political chaos could well be filled by elements
hostile to our values and sympathetic to our adversaries."32 It is in this region that
two priorities intersect: oil and the state of Israel.
In writing about American interests in the Middle East, William Quandt, a
leading mainstream Middle East scholar and former member of the National
Security Council in the Nixon and Carter Administrations, observed that "three
concems--oil, Israel, and the Soviet Union-were the driving forces behind
American Middle East policy throughout most of the period from the 1950s
through the 1980s." 33 In terms of oil, it is common knowledge that the vast energy
reserves (two-thirds of the world's total) located in the Saudi peninsula in
particular are a major concern of the United States.34
The U.S. State Department has described the region as "a stupendous source
of strategic power, and one of the greatest material prizes in world history,
probably the richest economic prize in the world in the field of foreign
investment,"3 5 or in President Eisenhower's words, the most "strategically
important area in the world." 36 While these quotes are from the 1940s and 1950s,
they have been reaffirmed continuously by high-ranking American officials and by
internal U.S. government documents. Writing about the Middle East, Richard
Nixon stated that "its oil is the lifeblood of modem industry, the Persian Gulf
region is the heart that pumps it, and the sea routes around the Gulf are the jugular
vein through which that lifeblood passes."3 In a subsequent book, Nixon argued
that because the Middle East is likely to remain "the only source of significant
exportable oil in the world for the next twenty-five years-we have no choice but
to remain engaged in the area."38 Furthermore, in explaining the U.S. rationale for
maintaining a military presence in the Gulf, then Secretary of Defense Cheney
stated in 1991 that
given the enormous resources that exist in that part of the world, and
given the fact that those resources are in decline elsewhere, the value of
32. The Crescent of Crisis: Iran anda Region ofRising Instability, TIME, Jan 15, 1979, at 18.
33. William B. Quandt, American Policy toward Democratic Political Movements in the Middle
East, in RULE AND RIGHTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST: DEMOCRACY, LAW, AND SOCIETY 165 (Ellis
Goldberg et al. eds., 1993).
34. The Middle East is also home to about 40 percent of the world's natural gas reserves as well.
BP StatisticalReview of World Energy, BP.COM/STATISTICALREVIEw (June 2012), http://www.bp.com/
assets/bpinternet/globalbp/globalbp uk english/reports andpublications/statistical energyreview 2
01 I/STAGING/local assets/pdf/statistical review of world energyfull report 2012.pdf.
35. NOAM CHOMSKY, WORLD ORDERS: OLD AND NEW 190 (1994) (internal quotations omitted).
36. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
37. RICHARD NIXON, THE REAL WAR 74 (1980).
38. RICHARD NIXON, SEIZE THE MOMENT: AMERICA'S CHALLENGE IN A ONE-SUPERPOWER
WORLD 214 (1992). Released British government documents in 2004 confirm this view. They revealed
that the U.S. government was considering seizing the Saudi and Kuwaiti oil fields in 1973 in response
to the Arab oil embargo. See Paul Reynolds, U.S. Ready to Seize Gulf Oil in 1973, BBC NEWS (Jan. 2,
2004, 8:01 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-east/3333995.stm.
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those resources is only going to rise in the years ahead, and the United
States and our major partners cannot afford to have those resources
controlled by somebody who is fundamentally hostile to our interests.39
During the Cold War, as in other parts of the developing world, U.S. interests

in the Middle East were challenged by independent Third World nationalism, in
both its secular and religious variants. Originally, this manifested itself in the form
of Arab and Iranian nationalism, led by Gamal Abdel Nasser and Mohammad
Mossadeq.

More recently, various forms of religious nationalism, otherwise

known as political Islam, specifically its mainstream variant, have posed a
challenge to American interests in the Arab-Islamic world. Quoting from the U.S.
State Department internal record, Gabriel Kolko observed that as early as 1950 it
was explicitly acknowledged that "[t]he main risk to the West [in the Middle East]
came from 'ultra-nationalist elements."' 40
In 1958, President Eisenhower told Vice President Nixon that the trouble we
are facing in the Middle East is that "we have a campaign of hatred against us, not
by the [Arab] governments but by the people. The people are on Nasser's side." 4 1

According to a National Security Council report at the time, the reason why the
United States was viewed negatively was because in
the eyes of the majority of Arabs the United States appears to be
opposed to the realization of the goals of Arab nationalism. They
believe that the United States is seeking to protect its interest in Near
East oil by supporting the status quo and opposing political or economic
42

progress.
This report went on to note that the
principal points of difficulty . . . are: the Arab-Israeli dispute; Arab
aspirations for self-determination and unity; widespread belief that the
United States desires to keep the Arab world disunited and is committed
to work with "reactionary" elements to that end; the Arab attitude
toward the East-West struggle; U.S. support of its Western "colonial"
allies; and problems of trade and economic development.43
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1945-1980 70 (1988). The architect of President Carter's Rapid Deployment Force in the Middle East,
Robert Komer, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, acknowledged the central
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to "deal with indigenous and regional unrest within the Persian Gulf region." Melvyn P. Leffler, From
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The issues of oil, Israel, independent indigenous nationalism, and the United
States intersect at a regional level by virtue of the U.S. decision to adopt Israel as a
regional ally to protect Western interests. In 1958, the National Security Council
proposed that a "logical corollary" against those who opposed American interests
"would be to support Israel as the only strong pro-Western power left in the
Middle East."44 At this time, it was Nasser who inspired the pan-Arab nationalism
that was threatening the stability and legitimacy of the pro-British and proAmerican oil-producing regimes.45
The British cabinet's Eastern Committee after World War I was to accurately
characterize these regimes as an "Arab Facade." 46 Lord Curzon, the British
foreign secretary at the time, described these countries as being "ruled and
administered under British guidance and controlled by a native Mohammedan, and,
as far as possible, by an Arab staff." 4 7 These weak monarchies and authoritarian
regimes would remain in power "veiled by constitutional fictions, as a protectorate,
a sphere of influence, a buffer State, and so on." 48
In America's strategic conception of the Middle East, Israel's role is that of a
regional power, preserving stability (read: American hegemony) in the region. The
tacit alliance between the U.S., Israel, and the "Arab Facade" was publicly
acknowledged in 1973 by the Senate's leading oil expert, Senator Henry Jackson,
who spoke in Congress about
"the strength and Western orientation of Israel on the Mediterranean and
Iran [under the Shah] on the Persian Gulf," two "reliable friends of the
United States," who, along with Saudi Arabia, "have served to inhibit
and contain those irresponsible and radical elements in certain Arab
states ... who, were they free to do so, would pose a grave threat indeed
to our principal sources of petroleum in the Persian Gulf."49
After the Cold War, Israel's strategic function remained the same.
This was confirmed in unambiguous terms by the former head of Israeli
military intelligence, General Shlomo Gazit. Writing in Yediot Ahronot he stated
Israel's main task has not changed at all, and it remains of crucial
importance. Its location at the centre of the Arab-Muslim Middle East
predestines Israel to be a devoted guardian of stability in all the
countries surrounding it. Its [role] is to protect the existing regimes: to
prevent or halt the processes of radicalisation, and to block the
expansion of fundamentalist religious zealotry. 50
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Scholars from the Dependency School of political development (i.e., on the
Left) maintain that what follows from these facts is that any movement toward
democratization of the Middle East poses a threat to U.S. interests in the area. This
is because democratic forces will refuse to play an accommodative or subordinate
role to Western foreign policy interests. In this context Gudrun Krimer has noted
that
the deep resentment of foreign intervention and Israeli policies among
Arab nationalists and Islamist activists, even limited liberalization
increases opposition to pro-Western policies. .. More liberal regimes in
the Arab World, therefore, are likely to be less accommodating
regarding Western economic and strategic interests than authoritarian
regimes that do not openly challenge the regional balance of power. 5
The United States historically has opposed democracy in the region because
"it is much simpler to manipulate a few ruling families-to secure fat orders for
arms and ensure that oil price remains low-than a wide variety of personalities
and policies bound to be thrown up by a democratic system," observes the veteran
Middle East journalist Dilip Hiro. 52 Reflecting on British policy in the Middle
East, "Prime Minister Harold Macmillan found it 'rather sad that circumstances
compel us to support reactionary and really rather outmoded regimes because we
know that the new forces, even if they begin with moderate opinions, always seem
to drift in violent revolutionary and strongly anti-Western positions."' 5 3 Former
Secretary of Defense and CIA chief James Schlesinger concurs with this
observation. He once asked a congressional committee
whether we seriously desire to prescribe democracy as the proper form
of government for other societies. Perhaps this issue is most clearly
posed in the Islamic world. Do we seriously want to change the
institutions of Saudi Arabia? The brief answer is no; over the years we
have sought to preserve those institutions, sometimes in preference to
more democratic forces coursing throughout the region. 54
Over the years this policy of opposing democratization in the Middle East has
enjoyed wide support among segments of the liberal intelligentsia in the United
States. For example, commenting on the CIA coup in 1953 that overthrow the
prime minister of Iran, Muhammad Mossadeq, and the nascent democratic
experiment that was emerging, the New York Times editorialized on the lessons
that should be learned from this event:
Underdeveloped countries with rich resources now have an object
lesson in the heavy cost that must be paid by one of their number which
goes berserk with fanatical nationalism. It is perhaps too much to hope
51. Gudrun Krimer, Liberalization and Democracy in the Arab World, MIDDLE E. R., Jan.-Feb.
1992, at 35.
52. CHOMSKY, supra note 35, at 198.
53. Id. at 199.
54. Yahya Sadowski, The New Orientalism and Democracy Debate, MIDDLE E. R., July-Aug.
1993, at 14.
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that Iran's experience will prevent the rise of Mossadeghs in other
countries, but that experience may at least strengthen the hands of the
more reasonable and far-seeing leaders.
While this quotation is from 1953, it is debatable whether there has been a
qualitative and substantive change on this topic over the years among members of
America's foreign policy establishment. For example, writing in the summer of
2011, after the start of the Arab Spring, Aaron David Miller, a liberal intellectual,
Middle East analyst, and advisor to six American Secretaries of State, wrote that
the "growing influence of Arab public opinion on the actions of Arab governments
and the absence of strong leaders will make it much tougher for the United States
to pursue its traditional policies. For America, the Arab Spring may well prove to
be more an Arab Winter." 56 He went on to note that
as public opinion becomes more influential in shaping domestic and
foreign policies in the Arab countries, the space available for U.S.
policies and influence may contract. The acquiescent autocrats have
acquiesced, albeit often grudgingly, in our approach to Iran, Gaza,
Israel, and counterterrorism. The new regimes won't, or at least not as
easily. Since most of our policies won't change quickly, or at all, the
United States will likely be in for a rough ride, with both emerging
governments and old ones.57
Similarly, Wesley Clark, former Supreme Allied Commander of NATO and
Democratic Party presidential candidate, reflected a similar concern about the
consequences of the Arab Spring for U.S. foreign policy. "In Tunisia, Egypt and
Libya," he observed, "strong Islamic sentiments have inevitably surfaced despite
the democratic and Western-oriented facade of the initial Arab Spring uprisings.
The future orientation of these states is likely to be less helpful to U.S. aims and
policies in the region than their predecessors."58 These observations have special
relevance for the future of Israel in the Middle East.
IV. THE ARAB SPRING AND ISRAEL

The spread of democratic rebellions across the Arab world was not welcomed
by Israel. 59 The influential Israeli historian Benny Morris blamed Islam for the
Arab Spring "which gradually eroded secularism and brought down pragmatic,
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prudent governments in the region."60 Prime Minister Netanyahu has described the
Arab Spring as an "Islamic, anti-Western, anti-liberal, anti-Israeli and antidemocratic wave." 6' He initially, however, instructed his Cabinet to remain silent
on the issue out fear of inflaming an uncertain situation. But instructions were
subsequently given to Israeli ambassadors in key capitals to emphasize Egyptian
stability as the revolution unfolded. President Shimon Peres, who was not bound
by these restrictions, stated that "[w]e always have had and still have great respect
for President Mubarak. . .. I don't say everything that he did was right, but he did
one thing which all of us are thankful to him for: he kept the peace in the Middle
East." 62 Reportedly Israel offered Mubarak asylum and the Israeli government was
lobbying the Obama Administration on his behalf until his final days.6 3
Israel's concerns about the Arab Spring are understandable. The spread of
democracy in the region fundamentally and qualitatively undermines Israel's
national security strategy, which similar to U.S. foreign policy goals, was
predicated on the survival of pro-Western authoritarian regimes. The problem with
this strategy, however, is that from the very beginning it was based on the faulty
assumption that the voice of the people did not matter in policy-making and that
these regimes would be around forever. This point is best exemplified by
Egyptian-Israeli relations.
It is often stated that for the last thirty-three years, Egypt and Israel have had a
peace treaty. This is a misleading characterization of the 1979 Camp David
Accords. It is more accurate to state that Israel has had a peace treaty-not with
Egypt-but with the Sadat-Mubarak regime and with the Egyptian ruling elites
that supported it. The people of Egypt were not consulted on the Camp David
Accords and they have had no input on this important foreign policy decision. The
same truism applies to Israel's 1994 peace treaty with Jordan. Moshe Arens, a
Likud party hardliner and three-time Minister of Defense, addressed this topic with
considerable candor and clarity at the start of the Arab Spring.
"The ugly facts," he noted, "are that the two peace treaties that Israel
concluded so far-the one with Egypt and the other with Jordan-were both
signed with dictators: Anwar Sadat and King Hussein."6 He added that "the
negotiations that for a while held some promise of reaching a peace agreement60. Benny Morris, Islam's Strangeholdon Israel, THE NATIONAL INTEREST (Sept. 12, 2011),
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/islams-stranglehold-israel-5875.
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with Syria and with the Palestine Liberation Organization-were also conducted
with unsavory dictators."65 With the gradual and inevitable spread of democracy
throughout the region, this national security strategy is no longer tenable. Israel's
long-term security in the Middle East can only be guaranteed when it makes peace
with the people of the region, not with the dictators that rule over them. This can
only happen if Israel is willing to give justice to Palestinians, which is a
precondition for its acceptance as legitimate state in the eyes of the people of the
Arab-Islamic world. Ibrahim Kalin, an adviser to the Turkish government,
captures this point quite succinctly in calling on Israel to reassess its strategic
priorities. "The Netanyahu government's defiant yet eventually self-destructive
approach is indicative of the eclipse of Israeli strategic thinking," he observes. 66
"Israeli politicians fail to understand that the fundamental values of the new
Middle East spearheaded by the Arab Spring are no longer occupation, dictatorship
and alienation but justice, freedom and rule of law. No policy that does not take
these values seriously can have legitimacy." 67
V.

CONCLUSION

There is a broad consensus among Middle East scholars that the region is
entering a new historical phrase. Today, in contrast with the past, the key internal
axis of conflict that will shape the contours of political power will be public
demands for citizenship rights and effective and accountable government. While
transitions to democracy will take time, and the consolidation of these transitions
even longer, there is no denying that the Arab Spring is a turning point in the
modem history of the region. The rules have changed and it can no longer be
business as usual. For the United States, this will require an adjustment in terms of
how it views and deals with a new Middle East. To his credit, at least rhetorically,
President Obama has been on the right side of history.
On May 19, 2011, President Obama delivered a major foreign policy speech
on the Arab Spring where he spoke about "a new chapter in American
diplomacy." 68 In contrast to his predecessors, he sought to strike a balance
between American interests and American values in the Middle East. He
acknowledged that
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a strategy based solely on the narrow pursuit of these [longstanding
American] interests will not fill an empty stomach or allow someone to
speak their mind. Moreover, failure to speak to the broader aspirations
of ordinary people will only feed the suspicion that has festered for
years that the United States pursues our interests at their expense. 69
In this speech, Obama announced a new policy toward the Middle East "to
promote reform across the region, and to support transitions to democracy."70 He
noted that while "each country is different, we need to speak honestly about the
principles we believe in, with friend and foe alike. Our message is simple," the
President stated, "[fi]f you take the risks that reform entails, you will have the full
support of the United States." 7 '
Whether the United States will be able to live up to these words remains to be
seen. The fact that the U.S. has resumed the sale of arms to Bahrain-despite its
crackdown on pro-democracy protesters-and the refusal to tie American aid to
Egypt to progress on democratization, notwithstanding the arrest of American
NGO workers by the Egyptian military, suggests greater continuity rather than a
departure in U.S. policy toward the Middle East.72
In his recent book, Obama and the Middle East,73 Fawaz Gerges echoes this
skeptical reading of American policy. He observes that Obama has "shown . . .
more continuity with the past than real change. He has adopted a centrist-realist
approach toward the region, an approach consistent with the dominant U.S. foreign
policy orientation."74 The problem with this traditional approach toward the
Middle East is that the old assumptions that shaped and guided America's
approach toward the region will no longer work. A specter is haunting U.S. policy
toward the Middle East. With mass revolution, democracy is now the only game
in town. Adjusting to this new reality will take time and it will be difficult. But
regardless of U.S. preferences or hopes, Washington is not in the driver seat. The
Arab-Islamic world is coming of age and we are all observers of this historic,
uncertain, and tumultuous phenomenon.
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